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A COMPREHENSIVE RETHINKING OF EQUAL PROTECTION POST-
OBERGEFELL: A PLEA FOR SUBSTANTIVITY IN LAW 
Shannon Gilreath* 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the case holding that same-sex marriage is a fundamental 
right that states cannot deny, is widely regarded by progressives as a civil rights 
milestone. Lochner v. New York, on the other hand, is nearly uniformly considered 
by constitutional scholars, progressive or not, as a virtual epithet—one of the worst 
blunders in Supreme Court history. In this Article, drawing together years of my 
ideas and scholarship written to link substantive equality outcomes with the practice 
of law, I argue, from a pro-gay rights perspective, that Obergefell and Lochner are 
actually cut from the same cloth and ultimately that substantive due process, the 
engine of both decisions, will never successfully vindicate the rights of gay Ameri-
cans or of other marginalized classes. I contend that, under Justice Kennedy’s lead-
ership, the Court’s continued subsumption of equal protection into the Due Process 
Clause actually perpetuates inequality, even when the outcome (like access to mar-
riage) appears to promote equality. The culmination of this analysis is my proffering 
of a theory of equal protection that is substantive in its own right.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Each concept—liberty and equal protection—leads to a stronger understanding 
of the other.1 
 
 
The notion of equality can capture some of our highest goals, but the law of 
equality does not correspond to those aspirations. In many respects it has made them 
incapable of legal achievement.2 
 
 
 _________________________  
 * Shannon Gilreath is Professor of Law and Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Wake 
Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC.    
 1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).  
 2. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Substantive Equality, in BUTTERFLY POLITICS 111 (2017). Professor 
MacKinnon’s work, of over four decades, on making equality material to those who need it most, is foundational in 
all that follows. Particularly, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, 
in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32-45 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED], and CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 44-57 (2005). 
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I began writing about equality in law, through the lens of gay experience, over a 
decade ago, with my first law review article on the topic published in 2006.3  Since 
then, my work has focused, nearly singularly, on the questions of the meaning of 
equality and how to make equality meaningful in law. From an initial inquiry into 
the inequality inherent in the Supreme Court’s tiered approach in its class-based 
equal protection jurisprudence,4 to a look at the interaction between the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments in free speech challenges involving anti-equality speech,5 
to a reappraisal of  Lawrence v. Texas, the case decriminalizing same-sex sex,6 in 
light of the inequalities that the much-heralded case perpetuated,7 to a plea for a sex 
equality appraisal of the same-sex marriage question,8 I have challenged the basic 
conceptions underpinning the “equality” agenda of the legal arm of the gay rights 
movement and, in doing so, argued for a reconceptualization of equal protection doc-
trine itself. Often, especially in the case of my reservations about same-sex marriage 
as an equality goal, I have felt a little like I was standing against a tidal wave.  
With the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which commanded, on substantive 
due process and equal protection grounds, access to marriage for same-sex couples, 
it seemed to me that it was time to bring together in one piece my argument for a 
substantive, not merely formal, approach to equality in law. In material ways, my 
fears, that access to marriage finally granted may upend the very movement for gay 
rights that achieved it, seem to be coming true. Now, it seems, is the time for a re-
newed plea for equality as distinct from equal access and for a fulsome argument 
about how modern equal protection doctrine actually works to entrench inequality.  
To that end, this article first traces the roots of equal protection jurisprudence, in 
Part I. In Part II, I examine the interplay between the substantive due process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, referred to here as the “abstractions” approach. Indeed, the melding of the 
substantive due process and Equal Protection Clauses that began in Lochner v. New 
York9 has, perhaps, reached its apogee in Obergefell. In Parts III and IV, respectively, 
I revisit my analysis of the Supreme Court’s tiered equal protection doctrine, focus-
ing primarily on the “immutability” requirement, reinforced as dicta in Obergefell, 
and its “similarly situated” method as primary engines of inequality. In Part V, I ask 
what exactly Obergefell achieves and what it means for the future of equality. Fi-
nally, in Part VI, I offer a hopeful, albeit tentative, look at the future of equality 
through an equal protection doctrine that is—can be—finally substantive.  
 _________________________  
 3. Shannon Gilreath, Of Fruit Flies and Men: Rethinking Immutability in Equal Protection Analysis—with 
a View toward a Constitutional Moral Imperative, 9 LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 1 (2006) [hereinafter Gilreath, 
Of Fruit Flies and Men]. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Shannon Gilreath, Tell Your Faggot Friend He Owes me $500 for My Broken Hand, 44 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 557, 558 (2009). 
 6. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003). 
 7. Shannon Gilreath, Some Penetrating Observations on the Fifth Anniversary of Lawrence v. Texas, 30 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 442, 442 (2009). 
 8. Shannon Gilreath, Arguing Against Arguing for Same-Sex Marriage, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 21, 28-35 
(2010). 
 9. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND SUBSTANTIVITY: NECESSARY 
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
Between 1865 and 1870, we adopted three major constitutional amendments 
dealing with the civil and political rights of citizens.10  The Thirteenth Amendment 
abolished slavery and “involuntary servitude”11; the Fifteenth Amendment guaran-
teed the right to vote regardless of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude”12; 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, in relevant part, provided that “No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”13 The Privileges or Immunities Clause,14 which is the most 
intuitive guarantee of civil and political rights, was early on given a very limited 
construction by the Supreme Court in The Buthers’ Benevolent Association of New 
Orleans v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company, known 
to posterity as the Slaughter- House Cases.15  
In 1869, Louisiana chartered a corporation and gave it a monopoly of slaughter-
houses, landings for cattle, and stockyards in a large area centered in New Orleans.16  
Butchers shut out of competition by the monopoly sued to challenge the state law 
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.17 The high Court split 5-4 and 
sustained the Louisiana law.18 According to the opinion written by Justice Miller, the 
trilogy of post-war amendments were limited in nature and effect, relating almost 
exclusively to “the freedom of the slave race … and the protection of the newly-
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised 
unlimited dominion over him.”19 The Privileges or Immunities Clause was effec-
tively rendered a redundancy, purportedly protecting only a handful of rights—no-
tably interstate travel—already protected elsewhere in the Constitution.20 The “sub-
stantive” revival of the Due Process Clause was not yet accomplished—indeed, the 
evisceration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would give birth by necessity of 
so-called “substantive due process” in the coming decades—therefore, Miller enter-
tained the due process challenge only in so far as it implicated a taking of property 
without due process.21 Miller found that it did not.22 Most introductory courses in 
constitutional law focus only on the importance of the Slaughterhouse Cases as the 
 _________________________  
 10. Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power To Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist 
Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 548 (1998). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 36 (1872). 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 43. 
 18. Id. at 83. 
 19. Id. at 71-72. 
 20. Id. at 74-77. 
 21. Id. at 79-81. 
 22. Id. at 80-81. 
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catalyst of the future development of the doctrine of substantive due process. But the 
Court went on to say, importantly for our purposes, “We doubt very much whether 
any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a 
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview” of 
the Equal Protection Clause.23   
There are significant reasons to doubt Justice Miller’s narrowing construction of 
the post-war amendments.24  Justice Bradley dissented on this point, writing, 
“[Blacks] may have been the primary cause of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment, but 
its language is general, embracing all citizens, and I think it was purposely so ex-
pressed.”25  Yet while the slash and burn jurisprudence of the Slaughterhouse Cases 
became the root sustaining a flowering judicial industry of discovering new rights 
embedded in the Due Process Clause—indeed, Justice Miller himself pronounced as 
much just four years after the Slaughterhouse Cases in Davidson v. New Orleans26—
no such substantive dimensions of equal protection would emerge.  
This preference shown for due process as a font of civil rights produced some 
bizarre decisions that were starkly anti-equality in effect. Perhaps the most infamous 
of these—an epithet in its own right—is the 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York. 
A New York statute set maximum daily and weekly working hours for bakers.27  Jo-
seph Lochner, who owned a bakery employing mostly immigrants, challenged the 
law.28  A cursory examination of the history of this period reveals appalling—by 
modern standards—working conditions in countless working-class jobs, baking in-
cluded.29  But a six justice majority in Lochner found labor laws “mere meddlesome 
interferences with the rights of the individual.”30 Among these rights, the Court went 
on, extending its earlier decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,31 were “[t]he general right 
to make a contract in relation to his business …. [and] the right to purchase or sell 
labor….”32 
Lochner has gone down in infamy as the acme of judicial over-reach. Yet to my 
way of thinking, the problem with Lochner is not that the justices recognized a right 
to contract. In fact, the Ninth Amendment taken together with the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause may leave room for the existence of such a right. Rather the problem 
is that the Court refused to take account of the equality implications of its decision, 
namely that the decision made possible the continued, unfettered exploitation of a 
relatively powerless working underclass. This blindness to equality as a preeminent 
constitutional value is shot through the Court’s substantive due process jurispru-
dence up until its most recent decisions.  
 _________________________  
 23. Id. at 81. 
 24. Id. at 82. 
 25. Id. at 123 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  
 26. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101-102 (1877). 
 27. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905). 
 28. PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 1, 12 (1998). 
 29. Id. at 8-12. 
 30. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61. 
 31. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
 32. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
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Robert Bork, most famous for his failed nomination to the Supreme Court, wrote 
of the high Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, quoting Lenin no less, 
“Who says A must say B.”  “Whoever says Roe,” Bork continued, “must say Lochner 
and [Dred] Scott.”33  I will come to Roe shortly, but first I will say a word about 
Lochner and Dred Scott, taking Dred Scott first. Bork was expanding on Professor 
David Currie’s contention that Dred Scott “was at least possibly the first application 
of substantive due process in the Supreme Court….”34  This may well be true, but it 
does not follow that Lochner, or even Roe, must follow Scott, even though there is 
much truth in Bork’s belief that they do.  
Dred Scott, possibly the darkest mark on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential 
record, saw a slave, Dred Scott, who had been taken for extended periods of resi-
dence in a free territory, challenge the right of his master to take him back as a slave 
to the slave holding state of their origin.35  Chief Justice Roger Taney and a Court 
made up primarily of other Southerners decided against Scott. But they went further, 
and it is this overreach that precipitated the Civil War.36 To summarize the 241 pages 
of convoluted opinion writing for our purposes, Taney wrote, in relevant part: 
The rights of property are united with the rights of person, and 
placed on the same ground by the [F]ifth [A]mendment to the Con-
stitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, and property, without due process of law. And an act of Con-
gress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or 
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property 
into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had com-
mitted no offense against the laws, could hardly be dignified with 
the name due process of law.37 
Unpacking this a bit, we see Taney effecting a substantive packing of a clause 
that otherwise speaks only to procedural guarantees—e.g., has the law been passed 
by Congress and signed by the President according to the constitutional mechanism. 
Taney’s second sentence in particular, “who had committed no offense,”38 assumes 
that the conduct of holding slaves in a free territory is a right that cannot be taken 
away by any means of process, otherwise any man who in fact did so would be com-
mitting an “offense against the laws.”39  This is the essence of substantive due pro-
cess as we know it—the principle that some rights are so fundamental that they can-
not be abridged, regardless of process.  
 _________________________  
 33. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 32 (1990) 
[hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA]. 
 34. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888 
271 (1985). 
 35. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 452 (1857). 
 36. Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case: With Notes on Affirmative Action, the Right to Die & Same-sex 
Marriage, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 39, 39, 40, 43 (1997). 
 37. Scott, 60 U.S. at 450. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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Having established that Dred Scott was a substantive due process case, we can 
now examine whether Bork is right. Must whoever says Roe also say Lochner and 
Dred Scott?  First, Lochner v. New York. The primary difference between Dred Scott 
and Lochner is that Lochner is a Fourteenth Amendment case. True enough, the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Fifth Amendment, under which Dred Scott was decided, 
have identical due process commands.40  But the Fourteenth Amendment commands 
something that the Fifth Amendment, glaringly, does not: equality.41   
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL ABSTRACTION: SOME 
EXAMPLES 
Lochner, standing as it now does as the premier example of what is wrong with 
substantive due process and, by extension, substantivity in judicial process generally, 
is a considerable barrier to acknowledging the inescapable way that law is made from 
the bench. The principle line of attack against Lochner, by Bork and numerous others 
on the political right, is that it is constitutionally rootless. In other words, say con-
servatives, substantivity in law means little more than the public policy preferences 
of unelected judges substituted for the legislative process.42  And, in the realm of 
substantive due process, this is invariably true. The criticism from the left is that 
substantivity in law, following Lochner, may lead to the wrong substance winning.43  
This is the principle argument against regulating anti-equality speech, or pornogra-
phy, or, indeed, for admitting that substance drives legal decision-making even when 
that substance is masquerading as formalism. When equality is conceived of as 
merely an abstraction, avoiding substance at all costs may seem necessary, if not 
inevitable.  
A substantive equality critique of Lochner, by contrast, does not fault the deci-
sion for its substantivity, but for its lack of equality, which is itself a substantive 
choice.44  Put another way, the Court’s failure to consider the equality implications 
of the liberty to contract took the substance of equality off the table and out of the 
decision, in effect reading it out of the Constitution. The fault in Lochner, therefore, 
is not its substantivity, but rather what that substance amounts to, which was the 
advancement of powerful economic interests at the expense of the less powerful. The 
abstraction of the liberty to contract, expressed as substantive due process rights al-
ways are, as wholly individualistic, obscured the actual substance (always there) of 
the decision itself. And that substance was unquestionably power-based.  
 _________________________  
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 42. No legal choice can be exactly amoral. Even the question of whether to choose a distributive form of 
equality or a substantive one does not happen in a vacuum. Judge Bork is as guilty as anyone of abstract defenses of 
cases he thinks were decided properly. For example, Brown v. Board of Education he says was “correct both legally 
and morally,” without further comment. See Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 19, 
21 (2003). Any argument for gay rights in the name of equal protection, on the contrary, is simply a hoax perpetrated 
by the upper classes. Id.   
 43. Id.  
 44. For an illuminating discussion, see MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS, supra note 2 at 7-8. 
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Now, consider Roe. Are there, in fact, equality dimensions to the abortion ques-
tion? It seems to me that the answer is undoubtedly yes. Judge Bork did not think so, 
writing, “no argument can be made that Roe v. Wade has any constitutional founda-
tion whatever.”45  This is such a curious stance, coming just after his admission that 
“equality was the theme of the Equal Protection Clause.”46  Thus, in Brown, he 
rightly suggests, the choice had to be against inequality.47   
The inequalities inherent in the social circumstances that make abortion neces-
sary are inescapable, especially when it is admitted that they are material, in an ex-
istential sense, to only half the population, defined as female. Most women who seek 
abortions have become pregnant by having sexual intercourse with men. As I have 
explored elsewhere, the very nature of this intercourse is unequal.48 Thus, in order to 
discuss the abortion consequences of this particular economy of inequality is neces-
sarily to broach the question of consent and sexual inequality generally. At this point, 
I will simply say that, while beyond the scope of this particular Article, the question 
of this underlying inequality is, curiously, most exposed in the abortion debate, 
when, for example, opponents of state funding for abortion would nevertheless per-
mit funding for abortion when the pregnancy results from rape or incest, as if in all 
other circumstances women, in fact, control sex.49  By treating pregnancies that result 
from rape or incest as if they warrant exceptions—thus, as if they are exceptional—
renders invisible the sexual violence that is the norm in sexual relations in the heter-
osexual model.50  Thus, sexual violence—a crucible of social inequality of the 
sexes—as a power relation goes unchallenged and unchanged.  
These same assumptions go unchallenged by the marriage equality movement, 
so-called, vindicated in Obergefell. In Lawrence, Obergefell’s precursor, Justice 
Kennedy waxed poetic about a same-sex relationship, which he was bent on trans-
figuring into a love story in the heterosexual (fictional) image.51 Justice Kennedy 
wrote about John Lawrence and Tyrone Garner as if the two were living a romantic 
ideal.52 They were not. No one, it seems, wanted to question the disparity in age, 
race, or class actually present.53  Our legal system does not care about inequalities in 
sexual relationships. At least, that is, the system does not care about inequalities that 
are normalized because they are principal tenets of male dominance. The general 
 _________________________  
 45. See BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 33, at 23.  
 46. Id. at 22. 
 47. Id. at 23. 
 48. See, Shannon Gilreath, Same-Sex (Monogamous) Marriage v. Polygamy: Macedo’s Incomplete Sex 
Equality Analysis, legal studies paper (2017), manuscript available at SSRN http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3009869 
(“But a consent standard that requires a yes, with the default being no, while a vast improvement over the old no-
means-yes default, is still problematic in a context in which sex between men and women is, in fact, unequal”). 
 49. Sandra Berenknopf, Judicial and Congressional Back-Door Methods That Limit the Effect of Roe v. 
Wade: There Is No Choice If There Is No Access, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 653, 656–57 (1997). 
 50. Melanie Randall & Vasanthi Venkatesh, Criminalizing Sexual Violence Against Women in Intimate Re-
lationships: State Obligations Under Human Rights Law, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 189, 189 (2016). 
 51. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 52. Id. at 567, 573-74, 578-79. 
 53. Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464, 1476 (2004). 
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assumption of consent in sexual relationships that do not involve children54 or ani-
mals55 or (more recently) rape as defined by law56 is a preeminent heterosexual 
value.57  In reality, heterosexuality’s privileges of privatized violence, economic in-
equality, and sexual aggression are simply extended, with impunity supplied by state 
sanction, into gay relationships, cloaked, as they now are after Obergefell, in privacy 
and the romanticism of the family ideal. Substantive due process is too often em-
ployed to elide inequality’s substance. 
And, of course, another issue raised in Lawrence, both by the penultimate para-
graph of the majority opinion58 and in Justice Scalia’s dissent59 and by Obergefell’s 
specific exclusion of polygamy60 highlights the presumption of consent as the normal 
course of sexual relationships in the monogamous heterosexual model. The ability 
of more people to see the harm in polygamous marriage exists precisely because 
assumptions run the other way. The kind of scrutiny with which we approach ideas 
of sexual agency, emotional and physical well-being, and consent in the context of 
polygamy is by and large absent from any mainstream academic discussion of mar-
riage per se. Most of the time it seems it is hardly worth asking whether the marriage 
is violent, whether it is happy, or even why so many end up with the death of the 
woman at the hands of her husband. Few are asking what connection there may be 
between marriage and family (read: heterosexuality, generally) and sexual harass-
ment and prostitution.61   
             This last point is important, again in both the context of abortion and of 
same-sex marriage as examples. What defines prostitution and sexual violation?  
Generally, in the West, it is the standard of consent.62  But a consent standard that 
requires a yes, with the default being no,63 while a vast improvement over the old 
no-means-yes default, is still problematic in a context in which sex between men and 
women is, in fact, unequal.64  How often is a yes a meaningful yes? How often is a 
yes simply surrender to the inevitable: “Okay, let’s just get it over with.”  How many 
 _________________________  
 54. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.25 (2016); Petit v. Erie Ins. Exch., 699 A.2d 
550, 224-25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997). 
 55. Rebecca F. Wisch, Table of State Animal Sexual Assault Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. MICH. ST. 
UNIV. COLL. OF L. (2017), https://www.animallaw.info/topic/table-state-animal-sexual-assault-laws, archived at 
https://perma.cc/CV6F-ZXSB. 
 56. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.24 (2016). 
 57. Shannon Gilreath, Macedo’s Incomplete Sex Equality Analysis, SYNDICATE, (February 1, 2018), 
https://syndicate.network/symposia/philosophy/just-married/ archived at https://perma.cc/33B8-KS54 [hereinafter 
Gilreath, SYNDICATE]. 
 58. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 59. Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 60. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
 61. There are notable feminist exceptions, see, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
GLOBAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, in ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 29 
(2006). 
 62. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 436 (2016).  
 63. Jessica Bennett, Campus Sex…With a Syllabus, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2016), http://www.ny-
times.com/2016/01/10/fashion/sexual-consent-assault-college-campuses.html?_r=0, archived at 
https://perma.cc/MQJ4-KKBV.  
 64. See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U. 
FLA. L. REV. 45, 69 (1990); for a sex equality alternative to “consent,” see MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, supra note 
62.  
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women surrender to the patriarchal imperative that the delivery of sex and sexuality 
is necessary for material survival, as in: she needs to stay in his house; she wants to 
keep the lights on; or the line of credit open; or money in the child’s college fund. Is 
this kind of capitulation really meaningful consent? In other words, does a consent 
standard simply raise the floor of sex inequality, so that men and women remain 
substantively unequal in sex, at an elevated but nevertheless static level?  Because 
polygamy is exotic—because the problems inherent in polygamous marriage are not 
“normal”—these problems of sexual abuse and gender hierarchy emerge in the pub-
lic consciousness.65  They emerge as social systemic and systematic. When they oc-
cur pervasively and systematically in monogamous marriages—indeed, it seems they 
are rarely not there—they are seldom examined.66 Socialization demands that they 
remain hidden. When they are visible, they are explained away as episodic, not sys-
temic.  
Consider, for example, how little things have changed in the 30 years since Pro-
fessor Catharine MacKinnon wrote, “[A]bortion policy has never been explicitly ap-
proached in the context of how women get pregnant, that is, as a consequence of 
intercourse under conditions of gender inequality; that is, as an issue of forced sex.”67  
Consider here the marital rape exception. Students, evidently misled by someone, 
will often say to me, “But Professor, the marital rape exception has been eliminated.”  
This is not true. Marriage, as we know it, which depends on sexual delivery, usually 
by women to men, would not survive if it were eliminated. So, in the face of much 
feminist organizing, it has adapted. Forced sex is still largely rendered invisible in 
the marital context.68  In roughly 20 states, special exemptions from prosecution exist 
if the parties are not living apart, or legally separated, or have not filed for divorce 
or an order of protection.69  Some states require the wife to report the rape within a 
short period of time.70 Some require that a wife’s resistance be overcome by physical 
force.71  Another group exempts husbands who rape wives under the age of consent 
or who are incapacitated physically or mentally.72  No can still mean yes in the con-
text of marriage, where presumably, the relationship between rapist and raped is 
most intimate. But apparently, this degree of intimacy is not necessary to render a 
“yes” less free or a “no” less meaningful.73  None of this is to say that the Supreme 
Court should have denied equal access to marriage on substantive due process 
grounds, but it is only to highlight how the pro-marriage movement used by the 
Court’s substantive due process precedent largely ignores equality to accomplish a 
 _________________________  
 65. Gilreath, SYNDICATE, supra note 57. 
 66. Id. 
 67. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 2 at 95-96.  
 68. Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1485 
(2000).  
 69. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN § 16-3-615(A) (2018). 
 70. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN § 16-3-615(B) (2018). 
 71. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 200.373 (LexisNexis 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1111(B) (2018). 
 72. See, e.g., KY REV. STAT. ANN § 510.030 (LexisNexis 2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 623-A:2(h) (2018). 
 73. See State v. Way, 254 S.E.2d 760, 761-62 (N.C. 1979) (clarifying that “if the actual penetration is ac-
complished with the woman’s consent, the accused is not guilty of rape….”).  
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goal that, in the long term, may actually entrench inequality. “Marriage equality” in 
this context is an oxymoron.  
Returning to Bork’s assertion that whoever says Roe must also say Lochner, we 
find that he is both correct and incorrect. He is correct in so far as the substantive 
due process analysis of the opinions goes. But Bork, like the Lochner Court itself, 
fails to acknowledge the equality interests—the substantive interests—placed out of 
reach by the abstractions employed to justify the outcome. For the Lochner Court it 
was the abstraction of the liberty to contract.74  For Bork it was the abstraction of 
textualism as an interpretive commitment.75  In modern equal protection jurispru-
dence, it has been the abstraction of the class-based approach, made further abstract 
through the Court’s shift to classification (as distinct from class) and the individual-
ity that that entails, and its “similarly situated” requirement.76   
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK  
The substantive usefulness of equal protection, and thus the promise of equality 
as a question of substance on which the Constitution is decidedly not neutral, lies 
mostly unfulfilled. Equality jurisprudence, as it is most often encountered in Amer-
ican constitutional law, is rarely substantive. The Immutability Doctrine serves as 
the linchpin of an (in)equality system that takes caste, in the form of hierarchy based 
on moral judgment codified in law, as an objective measure of some difference that 
merits legal (normative) disadvantage.77  The self-reinforcing duplicity of this sys-
tem, whereby powerful people (usually judges) mete out justice and right inequality 
when they see similarly situated persons treated differently, is a racket of sheer ge-
nius, wherein the already-powerful always control the standard by which same-
ness/difference is measured and, thereby, the mechanism of caste mobility, socially 
and legally.78 The truth of my assertion about power insulating itself is revealed in 
the Court’s own insight into its deliberative process—a rare glimpse into a process 
that is overwhelmingly accomplished sub rosa—in Washington v. Davis,79 requiring 
proof of intentional differential treatment, rather than disparate impact (proof of sub-
ordination alone), to establish discrimination in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.80  Distinguishing Title VII, under which proof of disparate impact is 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case,81  the Court opined: 
However this process [the disparate impact (subordination) test] 
proceeds, it involves a more probing judicial review of, and less def-
 _________________________  
 74. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905). 
 75. See BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 33, at 33. 
 76. Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-77 (1969).  
 77. SHANNON GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY: REALIZING GAY LIBERATION 39 (2011) 
[hereinafter GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY]. 
 78. This is what Catharine MacKinnon was criticizing, in the context of feminism, when she criticized a 
“differences approach.” See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN; A CASE 
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 42-4 (1979).  
 79. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 80. GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY, supra note 77, at 39. 
 81. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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erence to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and exec-
utives than is appropriate under the Constitution where special racial 
impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not dis-
posed to adopt this more rigorous standard for the purposes of ap-
plying the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in cases such as this. 
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent 
compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than an-
other would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps 
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing 
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and the average black than the 
more affluent white. 
Given that rule, such consequences would perhaps be likely to follow.82  
In other words, a genuine subordination/caste-based inquiry into purportedly 
neutral and objective laws would expose them as anything but.83 
In the law, the sameness/difference approach is, like all liberal constructs, fo-
cused on individual rights, even when it speaks categorically. First, in its legal man-
ifestation, requiring proof of discriminatory intent in order to establish discrimina-
tion, it requires discriminatory motivation by an individual institution or actor.84  
Second, it requires discriminatory impact to be measured in terms of discrete indi-
viduals, not groups.85  
Consequently, in critiquing equality arguments based on sameness/difference 
via trait immutability, my concern is both social and jurisprudential: social because 
focus on immutability is so important to popular argumentation about the legitimacy 
of anti-gay animus generally, and jurisprudential in that immutability has been cen-
tral in justifying the institutionalization of anti-gay discrimination in law. No critique 
of objectification, of dominance as such, can be had when the totality of the formulae 
available for analysis reduces to the objectivity—the normativity—of the descriptive 
perceptions of majoritarian morality (Your “choices” mark you for maltreatment be-
cause we say your “choices” are “bad.”). This is the purpose and effect (even when 
invoked with the best of intentions) of an immutability-based analysis. It keeps 
purely epistemic notions of right and wrong materially maintained by “science” or 
other supposedly-objective disciplines, presenting descriptive morality as ontology.  
In this system, those who are “socially allowed a self are also allowed the luxury 
of postulating its illusoriness and having that called a philosophical [or religious] 
position.”86  Immutability allows the powerful to say, simply, “your choice is the 
 _________________________  
 82. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247-248 (emphasis added). 
 83. This seems to be exactly what the staunchest opponents of substantive equality historically have feared 
the most. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 412 (1977); A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 8 (1978); Peter Westen, 
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 594-95 (1982). It is also why, when on the rare occasion that 
the law does side with the powerless, it is taken to be at its most illegitimate. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1959).  
 84. GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY, supra note 77, at 40. 
 85. Id. 
 86. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 210 (1989). 
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prerogative of law, but not your personhood,”87 while simultaneously regulating 
both. Or, as Robert Nagel put it, “There is the obvious but important possibility that 
one can ‘hate’ an individual’s behavior without hating the individual.”88  In this sys-
tem, gay personality is merely performative and morality is political; politics are 
morals. Since no existentiality is conceded for us, their values look benign, and op-
pression, if not obfuscated entirely, is presented as collateral. Richard Posner tells 
the truth when he writes:  
[I]f you (being male) say that you’d like to have sex with that nice-
looking young man but of course will not because you are law-abid-
ing, afraid of AIDS, or whatever, you will stand condemned in the 
minds of many as a disgusting faggot. Homosexual acts are pun-
ished in an effort, however futile, to destroy the inclination.89  
It is the identity that is assumed from the acts; and the acts are subsumed in (and 
assumed from) the identity. “I am gay,” is a philosophical/ontological statement, not 
merely a performative one.  
The gay side of the argument from immutability has usually been one of apol-
ogy: “Don’t punish us for something we cannot control.”  It hasn’t worked well, 
since most religionists think that perfection comes through suffering90 and that, even 
if gays are concededly “born that way,” we should not act on it. Straights, of course, 
are not told that their sexuality is merely performative or that they should refrain 
from acting on their heterosexuality91; thus the hermetic precision of a system that 
takes its own descriptive value judgments to be definitively objective. Even gays’ 
supposedly-destructive sexual “lifestyles” are not descriptively immoral in the same 
ways when their ingredients are remixed in the straight recipe. “Unsafe” sex, for 
example, is roundly condemned as irresponsible and dangerous when it is useful to 
do so in condemning gay people (usually gay men).92  But that same condom-less 
sex is a cause celébrè in straight society, where the potential for procreation sancti-
fies it.93 When engaged in by straight enthusiasts, “unsafe sex” quickly gives way to 
pleasanter euphemisms like “in the family way.”94  This “lifestyle choice” even be-
comes a party theme—we call it the “baby shower.”  Under the aegis of this kind of 
epistemologically hermetic doublethink, descriptive morality is presented in society 
 _________________________  
 87. And, concomitantly, “my straight self is not chosen, is natural, and therefore the measure of law.” 
GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY, supra note 77, at n.36. 
 88. Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense in Colorado, FIRST THINGS, May 1998 at 34, 35.  
 89. RICHARD. A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 233 (1992).  
 90. Mother Teresa, with a smile, reported telling a patient suffering terrible agony in the last stages of cancer, 
“You are suffering like Christ on the cross. So Jesus must be kissing you.”  The patient replied, “Mother Teresa, 
please tell Jesus to stop kissing me!” Philip Kosloski, 5 Enduring Quotes from St. Theresa of Calcutta, ALETEIA 
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://aleteia.org/2017/09/05/5-enduring-quotes-from-st-teresa-of-calcutta/, archived at 
https://perma.cc/CCG9-MEXR.  
 91. The exception to this rule is when straights’ sexual expression looks too much like gay sex, as in the case 
of facially “neutral” “sodomy” in some states. GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY, supra note 77, at 41. 
 92. Id. at 41-2. 
 93. The Roman Catholic Church, the world’s largest Christian denomination, actually requires that hetero-
sexual sex be “unsafe” in order for it to be considered holy (procreative). Id. at 42.  
 94. Id. 
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as natural and in the law as neutral.95  In other words, sexuality is mutable (straights 
can concede this because they know they have nothing to lose in the concession), 
and there is justification for punishing some types of sexual expression (those of 
gays and lesbians) because straights, in their majoritarian omnipotence, decree that 
those sexual expressions are “bad” or “deviant” or “unnatural” or “abnormal” or 
whatever other referent one might substitute for “different.” What passes for normal 
is based entirely on the straight say-so.  
British scholar, Nicholas Bamforth, summarizes immutability’s appeal96: 
Supporters of immutability claims … maintain that it is … imper-
missible for the law to penalize a person because of their sexual ori-
entation, and arguably to penalize expressions of it in the form of 
sexual activity. The law does not penalize people due to accidents 
of birth such as their sex or race, and even seeks to prevent them 
from being discriminated against on this basis in employment and 
related contexts—and it would surely be morally arbitrary to treat 
people unfavorably because of a characteristic which they have ac-
quired via an accident. In consequence, the law cannot consist-
ently—and should not—treat people unfavorably where an analo-
gous accident such as their sexual orientation is in issue.97   
The last sentence of Professor Bamforth’s synopsis reveals immutability’s im-
portance to a legal regime intent on seeing only sameness and difference as workable 
legal categories and, thereby, maintaining its hegemony.98 It is also a window into 
 _________________________  
 95. Adrienne Rich has written that under patriarchy for a woman to be “barren” is the mark of ultimate 
“human failure.” ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 249-52 
(1976). The unwillingness of many gays to procreate in the vagina-insert-penis model is a major source of our 
condemnation by the Heteroarchy, where procreation is seen as the ultimate human good—the ultimate fulfillment 
of nature. Gays are, therefore, “unnatural.”   
 96. NICHOLAS BAMFORTH, SEXUALITY, MORALS AND JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS 
LAW  203-06 (1997) [hereinafter BAMFORTH, SEXUALITY, MORALS AND JUSTICE].  
On the whole, I think Bamforth provides a brief but lucid account of the problems inherent in the argument from 
immutability. I do take issue, however, with his view, perhaps inherent in his own preoccupation with the moral 
model of argumentation, that “even if clear proof [of the biology of sexuality] could be found, theorists would still 
need to produce a separate moral account of why this particular immutable characteristic was not a valid basis for 
judging or regulating a person’s life.” Id. at 204. In the footnote to this assertion, Bamforth goes on to say that any 
related argument that sexual orientation is irrelevant to an individual’s ability to lead a meaningful life is unsupport-
able. Id. I don’t agree. Equality is not a constitutionally neutral concept, nor is it subsumed in merely moral reason-
ing. Equality, if it means anything substantive, must mean that personal values, even those based on choices (as most 
are), cannot be the basis for caste-based disadvantages unless they can be shown to work a normatively demonstrable 
civic harm (in the “John hit Mary” model), not merely a descriptively moral one (of the “God said so” model). Being 
equal or unequal in a constitutional system based on equality is first a legal status; only derivatively is it a moral 
one. Such was the case in Plessy v. Ferguson, finding inequality based on descriptive morality legal, see 163 U.S. 
537, 495 (1896) and in Brown v. Board of Education, finding inequality substantively unequal and therefore illegal, 
see 347 U.S. 483, 549 (1953). Considerable moral justification preceded and followed Plessy, necessarily. Like 
moralizing was not necessary after Brown; its legality, based upon the central assumption of a legal regime premised 
on equality—that equality is not neutral about inequality—needed no moralization. In other words, once the objec-
tivity of the “moral” position is exposed as a naked grab for power in a constitutional order supposedly not neutral 
on abuses through naked power, there is no need for a separate moral inquiry into what ought to be.  
 97. BAMFORTH, SEXUALITY, MORALS AND JUSTICE, supra note 96 at 203-04. 
 98. Id. at 205-06. 
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why the majority in Lawrence v. Texas decided to focus on an abstract notion of 
“liberty” as opposed to equality.   And it reveals why immutability is difficult as a 
winning strategy—why working within the system has garnered such unsatisfactory 
results, on the whole, for gay advocates.99 How do you prove immutability?  More 
generally, how do you prove causation in a system and to a system that simply 
changes the definition of causality when it is forced to confront difficult data?  Rad-
ical feminists in the 1980s presented sociological data establishing the link between 
pornography and sexual violence against women.100  The causality was ignored.  
Other “unbiased” studies appeared to refute it. There is an even greater body of lit-
erature, scientific studies and personal accountings, establishing the biologic causal-
ity of sexuality.101  It is ignored.102   
The Equal Protection Clause should be understood “as an attempt to protect dis-
advantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however deeply engrained and 
longstanding.”103  The Clause “looks forward, serving to invalidate practices that 
were widespread at the time of its ratification and that were expected to endure.”104  
When attempting to make their cases for equal treatment under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, gays and their advocates have seized on the 
most obvious biological marker of the Supreme Court’s equality paradigm—race.  
Race, they observe, is immutable, and immutability has, after all, found its way into 
textbooks and court decisions concerning equal protection analysis.105  But it is pre-
cisely this immutability linchpin, once introduced by gay advocates and ultimately 
 _________________________  
 99. Id.  
 100. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Sex Discrimination, 4 LAW & INEQ. 17, 38 (1986).    
 101. See, SHANNON GILREATH, SEXUAL IDENTITY LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND MATERIALS (2007) (Chap-
ter 1, collecting studies).  
There is also a body of literature arguing the legitimacy of chosen “political lesbianism.”  See, e.g., SHELIA JEFFREYS, 
THE LESBIAN HERESY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE LESBIAN SEXUAL REVOLUTION (1993). “Many lesbians, 
after all, have chosen to love women for political reasons, very often after half a lifetime of wifehood and mother-
hood in which they never thought of being attracted to women” Id. at 92. I don’t really buy the idea that sexual 
orientation is socially constructed, although I think its political meanings certainly are; and thus, sexuality reconsti-
tuted, as we experience it under hetero-supremacy, certainly is. I hope that I am never confronted with someone who 
asks me to believe that they “love [me] for political reasons.”  I know too much about how quickly fainthearted 
political people, even lesbian feminists, can be to find that kind of love comforting.  I also think that the fact that 
fewer gay men claim this as their experience of their sexuality speaks to the place of gender in sexuality. And even 
though there is something appealing in the idea of having men or women embrace homosexuality as a political 
statement, something about it is unsettling—primarily the idea that anyone could suddenly “choose” to be gay and 
then claim to know what that means politically or otherwise. It’s an uneasiness akin to the discomfort that some 
feminists, including myself, feel about male-to-female transsexuals claiming that they suddenly know what being a 
woman is all about.  
 102. It should also be pointed out that the immutability syllogism unwinds if we revisit the question of race 
as the paradigm immutable trait. If, suddenly, people could choose their race, and if people chose to be Black instead 
of white, would being Black become, again, a justifiable basis for imposing legal disadvantages? Or would we accept 
that in a post-Fourteenth Amendment America hierarchy based on race (or on any characteristic that does not pro-
duce demonstrable harm or otherwise limit the ability of a person to contribute meaningfully to the civic endeavor) 
are patently unconstitutional?   
 103. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution:  A Note on the Relationship Between Due 
Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1998). 
 104. Id. 
 105. GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY, supra note 77, at 47. 
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pulled by the courts, which causes many gay equal protection claims to come un-
hinged.106   
Various legal formulae have evolved in an effort to demystify the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s class/classification-based approach to equality. Primarily, they take the 
course of the formula laid out in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security 
Clearance Office.107  In High Tech Gays, the court held that suspect and quasi-sus-
pect classes for purposes of equal protection analysis are groups that (1) have “suf-
fered a history of discrimination”108; (2) “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguish-
ing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; (3) “are a minority or politi-
cally powerless.”109   
No court seems to dispute that gays have been the subject of historical persecu-
tion; indeed, Bowers itself—particularly Chief Justice Burger’s vitriolic concur-
rence—settled that point.110  But many courts have denied gays suspect class status 
and strict scrutiny, holding sexual orientation (usually spoken of strictly as homo-
sexuality) to be behavioral and, therefore, not immutable, or holding that gays do not 
lack political power in a way that renders them discrete and insular.111  
 _________________________  
 106. Lower courts have held that gays and lesbians meet the criteria of a suspect class for Equal Protection 
purposes, yet they have all been reversed on appeal. See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of 
Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 436 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261, 267-68 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and re-
manded, 518 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1996); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d, 155 
F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1998). In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010), the trial 
judge, in dicta, determined that gays were a suspect class, but did so without relying on immutability.  
 107. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1990).  
 108. It is often said that this discrimination must be “invidious,” in that it “embodies a gross unfairness that is 
sufficiently inconsistent with the ideals of equal protection to term it invidious”. See, Watkins v. United States, 847 
F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), diff. results reached on reh’g, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990). In Watkins, the Court associated the immutability query with the invidiousness query. 
847 F.2d at 1346.  
 109. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573. 
Modern Equal Protection analysis was born with Carolene Products and its famous footnote four. United States v. 
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In an opinion in which the Court basically surrendered in its war on 
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal policies, the Court used Footnote 4 to restate its guardianship of individual liberties 
and to preserve its power of review over such matters in the future. Because the Court specifically marked the rights 
of “discrete and insular” minorities for an especially searching review, the debate has arisen as to what constitutes 
“discrete and insular.”  The “immutability” argument is one attempt at an answer. The full text of Footnote 4 is as 
follows:   
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its 
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are 
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.  
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restrict those political processes which can ordinarily 
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny 
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.  
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, 
or national, or racial minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 110. Burger claimed that prohibitions against homosexual conduct had “ancient roots.”  Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting majority opinion at 192). That question is certainly 
debatable, with many historians arguing that widespread repression of gays is a phenomenon of the past 50 years 
(see historians brief in Lawrence), but Burger’s perception of “ancient” animus says something about the insidious-
ness of contemporary prejudice against gays.  
 111. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573. 
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But at the heart of the immutability controversy has been the claim that sexual 
orientation is not a discrete factor by which gays may be identified as a group.  Pro-
fessor Bruce Ackerman, for example, explained it this way:   
As a member of an anonymous group, each homosexual can seek to 
minimize the personal harm due to prejudice by keeping his or her 
sexual preference a tightly held secret. Although this is hardly a 
fully satisfactory response, secrecy does enable homosexuals to 
“exit” from prejudice in a way that blacks cannot.112 
Thus, the argument proceeds that gays are not definable in the way necessary to 
attain suspect class status. Professor Ackerman concludes that gays may be even less 
politically powerful than more obviously insular and discrete groups, e.g., African 
Americans, and that equal protection should be most concerned with those groups 
where the members are anonymous and diffuse and where group detachment is eas-
ier.113  I agree. The detachment Ackerman notes creates for gays a problem even 
worse than “tokenism”114; it creates “hiddenism,” by which “acting straight” is 
turned into a sado-profession and amplified into a sado-professionalism by which 
closeted gays actively work to injure the careers and professional/political/social as-
pirations of other gays.115  This is what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick named when she 
said, “it is entirely within the experience of gay people to find that a homophobic 
figure in power has, if anything, a disproportionate likelihood of being gay and clos-
eted.”116   
Professor Ackerman’s discussion of gays as an anonymous and diffuse minority 
conjures a pointed and important equality question. It is not the ability of gays to 
distance ourselves from our “group” that should essentially trouble us; rather it is the 
prejudice that drives the desire of some (if not many) gays to engage in this group 
exit that is most troublesome from an equality standpoint. The ability of gays to 
“‘pass’ and hide [our] sexual orientation when the going gets too rough. . . . while it 
may have saved a neck from the noose, is in no way less of a relinquishment of 
 _________________________  
The whole idea of political powerlessness is more than a little difficult to square with a Supreme Court jurisprudence 
that allows white male litigants to prevail under a suspect classification rationale. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (“[D]iscreteness and insularity [do not] constitute necessary preconditions to a 
holding that a particular classification is invidious.”).  But supremacist logic is rarely consistent on anything but the 
importance of supremacy itself. For an illuminating look at the Court’s lexicographic project of shifting subtly from 
“class” to “classification” in order to entrench power, see generally EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION (1999).   
 112. Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 730-31 (1985).  
 113. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L. J. 2313, 2372 n.188 (1997). 
 114. By “tokenism” I mean the presence of a few gays in places we have not been, visibly, before, often for 
the purpose of signaling (false) progress.  
 115. Ackerman, supra note 112 at 730-31. 
 116. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 81 (1992).  
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dignity, a loss of freedom, than otherwise inescapable victimization or brutality. El-
ementally, they are the same.”117  “Escape is a compromised freedom with a very 
heavy price.”118   
And, of course, not even all Blacks would fit the conventional definition of dis-
creteness. African Americans have (particularly historically) engaged in what is 
known as “passing,” in which an African American with particularly Caucasian fea-
tures passed as white to avoid discrimination.119  But historical analogy notwith-
standing, the fact that gays’ caste status is not necessarily marked by spatial segre-
gation can make it harder to see; and yet this same lack of visibility highlights the 
derivative nature of our status. Emphasis on immutability is thus a critical problem 
for gays asserting equality claims. It is also largely a problem that arose not from a 
settled jurisprudence, but from a long-standing misconception about equal protection 
analysis.  
Immutability does not figure centrally with any consistency in the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. In Lyng v. Castillo,120 cited as controlling in 
High Tech Gays, the Supreme Court declined to use strict scrutiny in assessing the 
constitutionality of provisions of the Federal Food Stamp Act that imposed different 
requirements on distant relatives or unrelated cohabitants than those for parents and 
children, holding that close relatives are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class because 
“as a historical matter, they have not been subjected to discrimination; they do not 
exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a 
discrete group; and that they are not a minority or politically powerless.”121 Lawyers 
know that language matters, but, as to equal protection, many seem to forget this 
important lesson. The conjunction or, used to link alternatives,122gets ignored, and 
the Court’s actual language (obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics) 
gets reduced to immutability only,123 or, at least, to immutability superordinately.124  
This could be due in part to the insistence of gay advocates and allies on stressing 
immutability, which continues to be an important part of political and legal strat-
egy.125 
 _________________________  
 117. SHANNON GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS: THE GAY PERSON IN AMERICA TODAY 129 (2006) [hereinafter 
GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS].  
 118. ANDREA DWORKIN, SCAPEGOAT: THE JEWS, ISRAEL, AND WOMEN’S LIBERATION 15 (2000). 
 119. For a dramatic portrayal of this concept, see generally ALEX HALEY & DAVID STEVENS, QUEEN: THE 
STORY OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY (1993), chronicling the life of Haley’s grandmother. 
 120. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986). 
 121. Id.  
 122. See, Or, ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (St. Martin’s Press 1999 ed.) (“CORE MEANING: a 
conjunction used to link two or more alternatives.”). 
 123. See, Anderson v. King Cty., 138 F.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (rejecting a challenge to a straight-only 
marriage law and holding that the challenge failed because “plaintiffs must make a showing of immutability, and 
they have not done so in this case.”) (emphasis added). 
 124. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990); Woodward v. 
United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Members of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes…ex-
hibit immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature.”). 
 125. For a lucid discussion of the social and political importance of biologic immutability to the acceptance 
of gays (and to gays’ understanding of what gay is), see Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. 
L. REV. 1495 (2009). Schmeiser recounts the reaction to Bill Richardson’s (2008 Democratic candidate for presi-
dent) answer, in response to gay singer Melissa Ethridge’s question, that homosexuality is “a choice.”  The gay 
audience booed and hissed. Id. at 1500.  
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Generally, the courts have rejected the immutability claim outright. Even in 
Romer v. Evans, the moment when gays arguably began to emerge from Hardwick’s 
shadow, the immutability argument fell on deaf judicial ears.126  The immutability 
argument presented at trial in Romer was a substantially watered down version; the 
plaintiffs argued that, although sexual orientation is “highly resistant to change,” its 
“etiology” is unknown and “it is not necessary for a trait to be genetically determined 
for it to be an involuntary trait that is highly resistant to change.”127  But underscoring 
the danger of muddying the waters with immutability assertions, the court apparently 
heard, and certainly addressed, a much more stringent argument.128  The court re-
jected the immutability claim by a reading of precisely the same science with which 
the plaintiffs’ hoped to buttress it.129  Be it true or not, the argument from science has 
done little to advance the gay cause in the courts.  
In any event, immutability has never been decisively established by the Supreme 
Court as necessary for a sustainable claim under the Equal Protection Clause. The 
Court so held in Bowen v. Gilliard,130 when it decided that relatives are not a suspect 
class. This lack of an immutability requirement could hardly be more evident than 
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Richardson,131 holding that aliens 
constitute a suspect class. Alienage is not immutable;132 in order to escape the class, 
one need only become a naturalized citizen.133  Yet the Court held that “[a]liens as a 
class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority’ . . . for whom such 
 _________________________  
Immutability is the party line of the Human Rights Campaign, the nation’s largest LGBT advocacy group. See 
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION, RESOURCE GUIDE TO COMING OUT FOR GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL AND 
TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 11 (2004) (“Your Sexuality or Gender Identity Is Not a Choice. It Chooses You.”). And 
it continues, despite its ineffectiveness, to be a part of litigation strategies. See, e.g., Chai Feldblum’s admission that, 
despite misgivings, she continues to make equal protection arguments grounded in immutability. See, e.g., Chai R. 
Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 278 n.189 (1996) 
(Feldblum admits that, despite misgivings, she continues to make equal protection arguments grounded in immuta-
bility). 
 126. Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immuta-
bility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 516 (1994). 
 127. Id. 
 128. “Plaintiffs strongly argue that homosexuality is inborn.” Evans v. Romer, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 
518586, at *11 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 1993), aff’d, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff’d, 517 U.S. 620, (1996). 
 129. “The preponderance of credible evidence suggests that there is a biologic or genetic ‘component’ of 
sexual orientation, but even Dr. Hamer, the witness who testified that he is 99.5% sure there is some genetic influence 
in forming sexual orientation, admits that sexual orientation is not completely genetic. The ultimate decision on 
‘nature’ vs ‘nurture’ is a decision for another forum, not this court, and the court makes no determination on this 
issue.”  Id. 
 130. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987).  
 131. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (striking an Arizona law that forbade welfare payments 
to aliens unless they had lived in the country for at least 15 years). 
 132. State courts, as well, have reached suspect class status for gays without invoking trait immutability. For 
example, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that “immutability – in the sense of inability to alter or change – is not 
necessary” because alienage and religious affiliation, which are not immutable, have been held to be suspect classi-
fications. The court held that the definition of a suspect class depends upon whether the characteristic assigned 
relevance has historically been regarded as defining a distinct and recognizable group and whether that group has 
been the target of social and political discrimination. Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 446 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1998). 
 133. Some lower courts have, for some time, seen this inconsistency bespeaking a receding importance for 
immutability, see, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army 875 F.2d 699, 711-28 (9th Cir. 1989)(Norris, J., concurring); 
Tanner, 971 P.2d. Scholars, too, have noted immutability’s relative unimportance or advocated its outright demise. 
See Balkin, supra note 113; Halley, supra note 126 at 507. 
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heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”134  Even if one were to argue that be-
coming a citizen is not a simple task and that alienage is not transitory, one could 
hardly argue with seriousness that one can easily change sexual orientations, even if 
such orientation is, in fact, mutable.135  As put succinctly in Watkins v. United States 
Army:   
Scientific proof aside, it seems appropriate to ask whether hetero-
sexuals feel capable of changing their sexual orientation. Would 
heterosexuals living in a city that passed an ordinance banning those 
who engaged in or desired to engage in sex with persons of the op-
posite sex find it easy not only to abstain from heterosexual activity 
but also to shift the object of their sexual desires to persons of the 
same sex?136   
There is additional support for the argument that immutability, by itself, is irrel-
evant to constitutional inquiry. There are a number of groups with characteristics 
that are, so far as we can know, immutable, whose claims are not afforded heightened 
scrutiny for equal protection purposes.  For example, neither the traits of intelligence 
nor physical disability have formed the basis for suspect class status under the Equal 
Protection Clause.137  Instead, where immutability is salient, it may be “immutability 
plus” that is really at work. The Frontiero plurality held that strict scrutiny was war-
ranted for gender discrimination claims because gender, in addition to being immu-
table, “frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”138  
Frontiero, then, may stand for the premise that “when a characteristic is both immu-
table and unrelated to the legitimate purposes at hand, discrimination based on it may 
suggest unfairness.”139  One could also plausibly read Justice Brennan’s formula in 
Frontiero as having nothing to do with the immutability of any physical trait, per se, 
but rather as focusing on the generally unalterable nature of stereotypes, which fre-
quently bear no relation to the ability of the stereotyped to contribute to society. This 
 _________________________  
 134. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.  
 135. For an example of the horrors of treatment in the past, see Anonymous, Electroshock: “The Agony of the 
Years After”, in JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY 201 (1992). The American Psychiatric Associa-
tion confirms that there is no scientific proof that “reparative therapy” (the so-called “ex-gay” movement) success-
fully changes sexual orientation and that “[t]he potential risks of ‘reparative therapy’ are great, including depression, 
anxiety, and self-destructive behavior.” Id. 
 136. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 137. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
 138. Id. at 686 (“[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the 
accident of birth . . . . [W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, 
and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability 
to perform or contribute to society.”); But see, Halley, supra note 126, at 508 n.15 (“There are plenty of careless 
misreaders of Frontiero who construe it to state a freestanding immutability factor uninflected by relatedness”). See, 
e.g., Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that prisoners do not constitute a suspect classifica-
tion because the status of incarceration is neither immutable nor an indicator of invidiousness) (citing Frontiero on 
immutability without reference to relatedness). For a discussion of how Frontiero’s exceptions swallow its theory, 
see JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 261 
(1983).  
 139. Halley, supra note 126, at 508 (emphasis in original). 
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kind of caste-based understanding of Frontiero is commensurate with Brennan’s ob-
servation that: 
[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelli-
gence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized sus-
pect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation 
to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory 
distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously 
relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without 
regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.140   
IV. SIMILARLY-SITUATED FORMALISM AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS: 
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AS A CASE STUDY 
Lawrence is largely a decision about the protection of sex generally—specifi-
cally of “sexual intimacy”—which the Court primarily equates to all sex, presump-
tively consensual,141 in the heterosexual image. In this way, the Court avoids the 
equality concerns at stake in Hardwick,142 namely that only homosexual sex is nei-
ther presumptively free nor constitutionally protected. The Court’s concern with lib-
erty’s substance meant that the Court extended heterosexuality’s presumptive right 
to sexual privacy to homosexuals, so long as the gay sex being had sufficiently re-
sembled heterosexual sex.143  This assimilation principle, reduced to equivalence, 
undergirds the Lawrence decision and permeates it.144   
The assimilation principle says to gay people that equality is defined in terms of 
equivalence to the pre-existing heteronormative standard.145  “Gay person,” says the 
assimilationist, “if you want equality with straight people, the approach is simple: be 
the same as straight people.”  This is exactly what most gay rights advocates, and 
ultimately the Court, said in Lawrence.146  Gay people deserve equality because they 
are constitutionally (morally, socially, jurisprudentially) equivalent to straight peo-
ple. Much of the Court’s logic, indeed most of the pro-gay rights briefs submitted on 
appeal,147 argues that gay people are deserving of equal protection in their sexual 
 _________________________  
 140. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686-687. 
 141. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (discussing rights of adults to enter into relationships within 
the confines of their homes). The presumption of consent bothers sex equality theorists like Professor Marc Spin-
delman. See Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, infra note 147. It bothers me, too. 
 142. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986). 
 143. Id. at 191.  
 144. “Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual per-
sons do.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. As Angela Harris notes, “Lawrence looks like an attempt to rebrand patriarchy 
by making it gay-friendly.”  Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of 
Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1577 (2006) (emphasis added).  
 145. Harris, supra note 144 at 1563.  
 146. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
 147. See, e.g., Brief for Constitutional Law Professors, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 136139 [hereinafter Law Professors]. In an effort to 
demonstrate to the Court just how much gay people are like straight people, the brief highlights “facts” that are so 
obvious that they sound totally absurd when read aloud:  “[gay people] shop, cook, and eat together, celebrate the 
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activity precisely because that activity sufficiently mirrors heterosexual sexual ac-
tivity, which is (of course) the presumptive good.148  The Court’s very discussion of 
the history of sodomy prohibitions connects these demeaning laws by the ways in 
which they influenced the heterosexual sexual experience (remember, the presump-
tive good) to show their constitutional deficiencies.149  The Court’s treatment of sod-
omy prohibitions in this way has equal protection ramifications to be sure. Unfortu-
nately, the question of whether the Court’s analysis will morph into a later argument 
which will claim that anti-sodomy laws (associated as they now are primarily with 
the heterosexual experience) do not provide evidence of a history of “invidious” dis-
crimination against gays as is required by generally accepted equal protection anal-
ysis is not yet answerable. I hope not.  
Situating Lawrence as the natural outgrowth of the reproductive privacy cases, 
the Court is able to declare that, “[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek 
autonomy for these purposes [defining one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and the mystery of human life], just as heterosexual persons do.”150  
The Court’s assimilation of homosexual sex into the heterosexual norm is thereby 
complete. Gay people do not deserve protections as gay people, but rather because 
we are sufficiently like straight people to merit protection.  
Viewing the Court’s decision in this way brings new meaning to the Court’s 
assertion that a decision grounded in “liberty,” in fact, advances equality. Indeed, the 
Lawrence majority assures, concerned as they were with Justice O’Connor’s envi-
sioned ban on heterosexual sodomy,151 that heterosexual men can now engage in oral 
 _________________________  
holidays together, and share one another’s families. . . . They rely on each other for companionship and support.”  
Id. at 13.  
The amicus brief filed by the ACLU likewise focuses on the domestic normalcy of gay people. “As adults, [gay 
people] form intimate relationships with one another, often have or adopt children, and interact with groups of rela-
tives that make up their extended families.”  Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Texas 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 8, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 
164132.   
Similar “like-straight” characterizations of gay life are to be found in the amici briefs of the Human Rights Campaign 
and the National Lesbian and Gay Law Association. For an excellent summary of the briefs and discussion, see Marc 
Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1619-1621 (2004) [hereinafter Spindelman, 
Surviving Lawrence v. Texas]. Spindelman’s work critiquing like-straight politics is excellent and foundational. In 
addition to the article, see Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1362 (2005).  
The urgency of the pro-gay groups to connect gays with the acceptable straight paradigm is overwhelming in these 
briefs. Their arguments reduce to an essence: Gays are sufficiently like straights to merit constitutional protection 
for their sexual behavior, because that sexual behavior is sufficiently domesticated to straight acceptability. One 
notable exception is the Brief for the Cato Institute by Professor William Eskridge. Eskridge specifically argues that 
“[t]he Texas Homosexual Conduct Law violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . for it targets gay people as an 
outlaw class because of antigay animus.”  Brief for CATO Institute, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
at 18, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152342.  
 148. As the Law Professors’ Brief put it, since the Court had recognized the undeniable importance of heter-
osexual intimacy, this recognition should be “for gay people no less than for heterosexuals.”  Law Professors, supra 
note 147, at 13.  
 149. Students sometimes ask me: Does homosexuality have a history?  After Lawrence, the answer to that 
question, at least legally, appears to be “yes,” if history means what historians make of an actual experience. See, 
Brief for Professors of History George Chauncey, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 3-4, Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 1152350. 
 150. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.  
 151. “Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a 
prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-
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sex without fear of prosecution. The Equal Protection Clause means that gay men 
receive the protection by default.  
The Court’s assimilation strategy becomes clear in its near wholesale adoption 
of Justice Stevens’ Hardwick dissent as the controlling analysis in Lawrence.152  Ste-
vens’ dissent proceeds on the logic that Georgia’s law at issue in Hardwick was con-
stitutionally faulty because it treaded on heterosexual autonomy.153  He is preoccu-
pied with the notion that to “totally prohibit” sodomy would collide with the privacy 
rights of heterosexuals, as established, both married and single, by the very line of 
privacy cases the Court relies upon in its articulation of the liberty of sexual inti-
macy.154  Stevens believed that such a prohibition clearly violated these heterosexual 
rights.155  This starting move by Stevens reflects his inability to abstract himself from 
the dictates of his own identity position, from which he can only analogize or gener-
alize. Then, by an equal application theory, he extends heterosexual privilege to the 
homosexual, made as he is in the heterosexual’s image:  
Although the meaning of the principle that “all men are created 
equal” is not always clear, it surely must mean that every free citizen 
has the same interest in “liberty” that the members of the [hetero-
sexual] majority share. From the standpoint of the individual, the 
homosexual and the heterosexual have the same interest in deciding 
how he will live his own life, and, more narrowly, how he will con-
duct himself in his personal and voluntary associations with his 
companions. State intrusion into the private conduct of either is 
equally burdensome.156 
The Court’s transmutation of Stevens’ Hardwick dissent into Kennedy’s Law-
rence majority opinion gives life to its dubious prophecy:  
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect 
for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are 
linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point ad-
vances both interests. If protected conduct is made criminal and the 
law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, 
its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for 
equal protection reasons.157 
 _________________________  
sex participants.” Id. at 575. Indeed, Justice O’Connor raised precisely this question. Id. at 584-85. (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  
 152. “Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here.”  
Id. at 578.  
 153. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 156. Id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 157. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.  
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This is a curious formula. As Marc Spindelman observed, “the Court vindicates 
sexual liberty by recognizing heterosexuals’ sexual rights and advances ‘equality of 
treatment’ by extending liberty to [gays]. Rights that are made to the king’s measure 
are fit for a queen.”158  This is distributive justice at its acme. The more the Court 
critically evaluates the rights of gays the more it concentrates on the presumptive 
rights of heterosexuals.  
Would not the Court have taken a more honest jurisprudential look at the plight 
of gay Americans had it engaged in a substantive equality analysis?  That is to say 
had it seen the hierarchical and, therefore, anti-equality dimensions of a law that 
criminalizes homosexual expressions of intimacy (or even non-intimate sex)—the 
very conduct by which gays as totally sexualized beings are defined—even if such 
laws facially applied to heterosexuals, too.159  One needs no analogies to marriage or 
romanticized heterosexual intimacy to see this. Justice O’Connor’s nominally equal 
protection-based concurrence hints at this problem,160 but her analysis of the issues 
stops far short of substantive equality (although it may constitute a classic formal 
equality analysis).161  By refusing to acknowledge hierarchy in this way, the Court 
scaffolds it. The superior constitutional status of heterosexuals (men, at least) is both 
the doorway and the ceiling of homosexual rights.  
And what’s wrong with that? Lawrence’s celebrants will ask. Well, nothing if 
you believe, as the Court apparently did, that equality is a numbers game, counting 
rights, quantities and uniformities: likes alike and unalikes unalike.162  But if you 
believe that true equality cannot be found in acquiescence in a system where the 
oppressed must assume the appearance of the oppressor in order to enjoy freedom, 
then the Court’s analysis presents serious moral and philosophical dilemmas. If free-
dom for gays is to be had only in the legal institutionalization of compulsory heter-
osexuality, in the mere mimicry of the privileged, is it really freedom at all?  Does 
real equality lie in the exchange of gay identity for the implicit safety of heteronor-
mative assimilation?   
 _________________________  
 158. Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 147, at 1630.  
 159. “Sodomy . . . is such an intrinsic characteristic of homosexuals, and so exclusive to us, that it constitutes 
a rhetorical proxy for us. It is our metonym.” Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and 
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1737 (1993).  
 160. “Rather than relying on the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
as the Court does, I base my conclusion on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.” Lawrence, 539 
U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 161. Justice O’Connor, of course, begins with the faulty premise that Equal Protection “is essentially a direc-
tion that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”  Id. (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). She goes on to recognize that the effects of the existence of the Texas statute go far 
beyond the potential for criminal prosecution. Id. at 581-82. But the “similarly situated” principle blinds Justice 
O’Connor to the caste-creating effects of the statute, were its facial discrimination removed. “The Equal Protection 
Clause ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’”  Id. at 584 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 
(1996)) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). “Whether a sodomy law . . 
. is neutral both in effect and application . . . is an issue that need not be decided today.”  Id. What Justice O’Connor 
fails to realize is that a sodomy law can never be neutral in “effect,” even if it were to be neutral in application. Even 
in such an imaginary regime, heterosexuals would always be being punished for engaging in acts common to homo-
sexuals, not for any quality of their superior heterosexual orientation.  
 162. “Likes alike, unalikes unalike” is a useful coinage I first heard Catharine MacKinnon employ in public 
lectures, for example at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (Feb. 18, 2009). See also, MACKINNON, Sub-
stantive Equality, supra note 2, at 111. 
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In fact, Lawrence, its equality outcome notwithstanding, further isolates gays 
rather than providing them equal citizenship. From the very outset of its opinion, the 
Lawrence majority, in the parlance of privacy, makes clear that what they are artic-
ulating is an individuated and individuating right.163  “Liberty,” Kennedy posits, 
“protects the person [read: individual] from unwarranted government intrusions into 
. . . private places.”164  This pronouncement, coupled with the historiography the 
Court embraces—a history that disconnects anti-sodomy persecutions from the gay 
experience—avoids the class-based analysis that a substantive equality approach 
would have required and, thereby, overlooks (or at least looks through) the gay com-
munity. 165  As the Lawrence decision sees gay people, we have no identity or worth 
of our own, nothing that is separate from the heteronormative definition. As long as 
that definition is intact, gay people can continue with the “lifestyle” choices that 
Justice Kennedy concedes by analogy from straight identity. In the Court’s analysis, 
heterosexuals are again the heroes of the constitutional drama, and gay people are 
the mendicants. The use of privacy, not equality, reifies the bitter heteronormative 
prerequisite gay people face daily: to be free we must be like, we must be palatable 
to the heterosexual majority. 
Justice Kennedy’s explication of liberty seems to presuppose that gay people 
have the same inner-self recognized for straight people and denied to gay people in 
Hardwick. What Kennedy drastically misapprehends, however, is whether this inner-
self can be free in the isolation to which Kennedy’s majority opinion assigns it. Law-
rence announced a curious rule: Gay people have a right to define their own desti-
nies, which includes, the Court says, their intimacies.166  But that destiny seems to 
extend only as far as the door of the new closet the Court creates. Gay people will 
not be sent to jail for consensual sex in private, but any illumination of these “bond[s] 
that [may be] more enduring”167 to an unwilling heterosexual establishment is sub-
ject to the hammer of heteronormative conformity. Lower courts have held Lawrence 
to cover only the most closeted of sex—the most private—so that oral sex, for ex-
ample, can still be punished more harshly than paradigmatic heterosexual sex (vagi-
nal) if it occurs in public,168 or for hire,169 or even when state legislatures have gone 
to great pains to decriminalize the conduct, as have many states with oral sex be-
tween minors close in age.170  Even rapists may have their sentences enhanced if they 
 _________________________  
 163. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565. 
 164. Id. at 562 (emphasis added). 
 165. The imperative of an equality norm that recognizes group realities has been understood from perspectives 
other than gay liberation as well. “With the inability to assert a group reality—an ability that only the subordinated 
need—comes the shift away from realities of power in the world and toward the search for ‘identity’ . . . . It changes 
the subject, as it were, or tries to.”  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Keeping It Real: On Anti-”Essentialism”, in 
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 75 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002).  
 166. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 167. Id. at 567.  
 168. See, e.g., In re R.L.C., 635 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (“It was undisputed that the conduct occurred 
in a car parked in a bowling alley parking lot. The crimes against nature statute remains applicable where public 
conduct is involved.”).  
 169. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233, 1236 (La. 2005).  
 170. See, In re R.L.C., 635 S.E.2d at 5-8 (Elmore, J., dissenting). 
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violate their victims orally or anally.171  This is not to suggest—in any way—that the 
rapist is sympathetic; rather I am suggesting that rape is made no worse simply be-
cause the form it takes is a violent mirror of traditionally homosexual sex acts. All 
of these painful associations make it difficult for gays to have the free inner-self 
Kennedy’s opinion imagines for us. Lawrence allows bigoted judges, reminiscent of 
Chief Justice Burger in Hardwick, to continue to enact homophobia into law.  
Of course, a necessary precursor to the Court’s approach is the a priori assertion, 
taken as gospel, that heterosexuality is the measure of the good.172  Heterosexuality 
is citizenship, presumptively and really. The assimilationist, “similarly situated” 
standard says gays are to be judged equivalent to the “good” when we are sufficiently 
proximate to the heterosexual paradigm.  In the case of Lawrence and Garner, a gay 
couple happened to be engaging in a sex act that a substantial number of straight 
couples engage in; therefore, those acts and the participants deserve protection based 
upon the heterosexual paradigm.173  Privacy protects gay sexual conduct because it 
(as suggested by current data) is substantially equivalent to heterosexual sexual con-
duct. The conduct at issue (oral and anal sex) must be, and presumptively should be, 
protected for heterosexuals. Gay people get the benefit of this protection, too. But 
make no mistake: heterosexuality is the individuating standard. The individuated 
right of sexual autonomy elucidated in Lawrence has no room for the group realities 
that define the place of the gay individual in American society, law, and politics. 
These defining issues of dominance and hierarchy are both the symptom and the root 
cause of sodomy prohibitions aimed at same-sex sexual expression.  
V. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES: MORE ABSTRACTION, AND SOME POSSIBLE HINTS 
AT FUTURE DIRECTION 
As he did in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy begins his opinion in Obergefell with 
an abstraction, writing: 
The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty 
that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a law-
ful realm, to define and express their identity. The petitioners in 
these cases seek to find that liberty by marrying someone of the 
 _________________________  
 171. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
[I]f a seventeen-year-old male who engages in an act of sodomy with a female under the age of sixteen years is 
convicted of aggravated child molestation, he is subject to a mandatory sentence of ten years imprisonment without 
possibility of parole. If, however, that same teenage male engages in an act of sexual intercourse with the same 
female child and is convicted of statutory rape, he is guilty of only a misdemeanor. 
 172. See, e.g., Jose Gabilondo, Irrational Exuberance About Babies: The Taste for Heterosexuality and Its 
Conspicuous Reproduction, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 2 (2008). 
 173. See, WILLIAM D. MOSHER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND 
SELECTED HEALTH MEASURES: MEN AND WOMEN 15-44 YEARS OF AGE, UNITED STATES, 2002, at 3 (2005), 
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad362.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/YX6W-Y2K8 (reporting that 90% of males and 
88% of females between 25 and 44 years of age had engaged in oral sex with a member of the opposite sex. The 
figures for anal sex were 40% percent for males and 35% for females. Among males 22 to 24 years of age, 7.4% 
reported engaging in sex with another male. 12.4% of females between 15 and 24 years of age reported engaging in 
sex with another female).  
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same sex and having their marriages deemed lawful on the same 
terms and conditions as marriages between persons of the opposite 
sex.174 
Building on what he did doctrinally in Lawrence, Kennedy writes equal protec-
tion into the Due Process Clause—a move that is curious given the reality that equal 
protection stands on its own terms in the same amendment. Equality in any substan-
tive sense simply isn’t present. The nearest thing to it in the opinion seems to be a 
principle of equal access which, again, follows the similarly situated analysis, argu-
ing forcefully that gay people are just like straight people.175  The work begun in 
Lawrence is perfected.  
In part II of the opinion, Kennedy explains, completely accurately, that the work 
of the gay marriage lobby has only ever been about merely assimilating into marriage 
as it is, without change.176  Then, for the first time at the Supreme Court, Kennedy 
describes homosexuality as immutable, writing, “And their immutable nature dic-
tates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound commitment.”177  
Then, explaining how liberty in due process has come to include “dignity” for ho-
mosexuals “in their own distinct identity,”178 Kennedy reiterates that homosexuality 
“is both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable.”179  Taken alone, 
such expressions by the Court are extraordinary, even though they do little work 
(mechanically, so to speak) in the Obergefell decision itself.  
Given the centrality that immutability has assumed historically in the develop-
ment of equal protection jurisprudence, especially where gays have been con-
cerned,180 numerous possibilities are opened by the Court’s acquiescence in the, now 
largely-undisputed, idea that sexual orientation is immutable.181  Will gays now be 
elevated from bottom-tier scrutiny status on par with women or Blacks (or gender or 
race, respectively)?  Having supplied the final necessary piece of the tiered-scrutiny 
analysis, such would seem to be the logical extension of Obergefell, even though 
that is not what Justice Kennedy ultimately does in the opinion itself.  
If this elevation in fact happens, will it be to intermediate scrutiny, which seems 
to be mostly likely and had, in fact, been argued by the justice department under 
President Obama,182 or to strict scrutiny?  Are there reasons for gay advocates to 
argue for one over the other?  And are the concerns that drove some advocates for 
women’s equality to argue for something less than strict scrutiny, fearing strict scru-
tiny’s double-edged consequences, even cognizable to a gay movement that now 
 _________________________  
 174. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015). 
 175. See id. at 2604. 
 176. Id. at 2595-97. 
 177. Id. at 2594. 
 178. Id. at 2596. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See, GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY, supra note 77, at 50-52. 
 181. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596. 
 182. See, Letter from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 
(Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/557201394151530910116.pdf, archived at 
https://perma.cc/2LNV-BQNF).    
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prizes assimilation above all?  By potentially opening up the legal horizon for gays 
as a class, Obergefell raises these questions and more.  
But Kennedy’s opinion merely gestures to the familiar equal protection frame-
work; it does not engage it directly. Obergefell is first and foremost a due process 
decision, with privacy as its substance. Kennedy situates his opinion as a natural 
consequence of the privacy cases including those regarding contraception, family 
relationships, procreation, and childrearing. From this posture, Kennedy makes the 
shift to fundamental rights language that Lawrence did not muster. “A second prin-
ciple in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because 
it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to individuals.”183 
Kennedy then moves to deal with Lawrence directly, holding that Lawrence was 
about a “right…to…intimate association.”184  The next several pages of the opinion 
are devoted to waxing eloquent about marriage as an institution, explaining how 
marriage has changed over time (the elimination of coverture, for example), and to 
explaining how same-sex couples are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples with 
regard to marriage.185   
Justice Kennedy gets to equal protection last by way of what constitutional 
scholars generally call a “hybrid” equal protection claim. This type of claim works 
when a non-suspect class nevertheless receives heightened scrutiny because the right 
of which they are deprived by operation of the law, which targets them as a class, 
happens to be, by the Court’s denomination, fundamental.186  For an example, Justice 
Kennedy offers Zablocki v. Redhale.187  Marriage was the fundamental right at issue 
in Zablocki, since fathers who were behind on their child support payments were 
prohibited from marrying under the state law before the Court.188  And the father’s 
claim received strict scrutiny because, even though deadbeat dads have not been held 
to be a suspect class, defined as such they were being denied a fundamental right.189   
His use of Zablocki as illustrative highlights what Justice Kennedy did not do in 
Obergefell.  Despite his admission that sexual orientation is immutable, he did not 
elevate gay people from the bottom of the tiered hierarchy for deciding equal pro-
tection claims to the top, suspect rung.190  They only receive heightened scrutiny in 
Obergefell because of the all-important right of marriage at stake.191  This is made 
all the stranger considering this example is followed immediately by a retrospective 
on cases involving “invidious sex-based classifications,” which get heightened, in-
termediate scrutiny.192  Is sexual orientation like gender, which is to say is it pertinent 
as a classification in its own right, or isn’t it?    
 _________________________  
 183. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 2595-97. 
 186. Id. at 2597-99. 
 187. Id. at 2590. 
 188. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375-76 (1978). 
 189. Id. at 383. 
 190. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.  
 191. Id. at 2602. 
 192. Id. at 2604. 
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Ultimately, however, it is the hybrid claim analysis that controls the opinion. 
“[T]he Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjusti-
fied infringement of the fundamental right to marry.”193  Ultimately, the right at issue 
takes precedence. Nothing new, doctrinally speaking, is happening here. Gay people 
remain on the bottom of the equality pile, vindicated momentarily because they are 
similarly situated with straight people in relation to a fundamental right. The right 
drives the case opinion; gay people are simply the vehicle. The abstraction that is 
substantive due process continues to control the outcome, and no substantive change 
for gays and lesbians, as such, happens. Do other forms of discrimination against us 
merit heightened scrutiny review, like “invidious sex-based classifications” would?  
By avoiding a substantive equality decision of the case, the Obergefell decision 
leaves us with no answers. There is a net increase in equality here, if that is taken to 
be equal access to a right deemed fundamental, but this is not an equality-based de-
cision. And whether or not Justice Kennedy’s concession of immutability will propel 
us further along the formal equality route remains to be seen. 
VI. EQUALITY: THE FUTURE 
What would substantive equality look like for gay people—for all people?  First, 
substantive equality would abandon the tiered framework currently advanced by the 
Court. If inequality is a question of hierarchy, then a hierarchical approach cannot 
do anything other than entrench inequality. Second, and relatedly, the similarly-sit-
uated threshold to even getting an inequality claim heard must also be abandoned. It 
conceals the status quo by ignoring the fact that inequality, as a social construct pre-
dominantly, precedes government action. In the marriage context, for example, the 
question—seemingly determinant in the Court’s logic—is how closely the relation-
ships of homosexual people approximate those of heterosexual people. But why 
should the burden lie with gay people to prove we are like straight people before we 
deserve equality with them?  After all, heterosexuality is as different from homosex-
uality as homosexuality is from heterosexuality. Justice Kennedy’s poetic commit-
ment to allowing people to control their own destinies seems rather petty if that des-
tiny is already scripted for us.  
From this perspective, sexual orientation may not qualify as a difference at all, 
except that it has been constructed into one by the heterosexual hierarchy that has 
used it as a tool for dominance. From the assumptions of heterosexual male suprem-
acy come categorical distinctions that matter, which have been gender and sexual 
orientation. In this political reality, difference is only consequential as a tool for so-
cial power. Justice Kennedy’s privacy-based hybrid rationale recognized that a con-
structed difference existed and should be unconstitutional because, as the majority 
understood it, the difference (the gender of partners in marriage) was an artificial 
one. The individuated nature of the substantive due process right, however, ensured 
that the Court stopped here, without exposing and considering the root cause of the 
epistemological distinctions drawn by the prohibition. The kind of substantive equal-
ity approach I envision would have gone further. It would have given gay people 
 _________________________  
 193. Id. 
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access, finally, to the standard by which differences are measured and power meted 
out, rather than, as Obergefell does, rest on the determination that resulted when the 
Court measured one group’s (gays) differences against the standard set by the group 
(straights) that constructed the differences.194   
If the Court is to cease asking questions of categorized difference, what ques-
tions should the Court ask?  A substantive approach to inequality would ask whether 
the law at issue promoted the dominance of one group with the consequence of the 
subordination of the target group, in a socio-political reality in which the groups are, 
in fact, unequal as demonstrated by the existence of an apparent power differential, 
and where the socio-political (and legal) hierarchy is constructed to exclude the tar-
get group from power. In short, this approach is the revivification of Justice Harlan’s 
Plessy dissent: There is no caste here.195  This approach, of course, requires the Court 
to realize things it may not wish to realize. It requires the Court to depart from a 
historical jurisprudence of formal equality only, and to begin to ask questions that 
are so hard because they are so simple. It requires the Court to distinguish the op-
pressed from the oppressor, victim from victimizer—powerful from powerless. It 
requires that the Court examine inequality as it really exists—in reality—not merely 
in the abstract world of judges and law professors. 
The paradigm case for a substantive equality analysis of the questions presented 
by Obergefell is not found in the contraception cases and their endangered privacy, 
but rather in another case the Court relies on to prove its due process analysis,  Loving 
v. Virginia196, in which the Court struck down anti-miscegenation laws as discrimi-
natory tools to maintain white supremacy.197 The Court invalidated the Virginia law 
 _________________________  
 194. I continue to believe that “Equality, then, is the combination of personal and civic freedom; it is a com-
bination of the private and the public. While it is fair to say that one cannot enjoy civic freedom without first pos-
sessing personal liberty, one is not free until one has a role in shaping the public mechanisms that govern one’s 
destiny.”  GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 117, at 129-130.  
 195. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 196. I have not chosen Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka as my paradigm (though it is the most com-
monly touted equality case), because I do not believe Brown, in fact, to be a substantive equality case. 347 U.S. 483 
(1953). By my reading of it, Brown, unlike Loving, announces no new equality theory. The Brown Court simply 
applied the Plessy Court’s formal equality analysis (the likeness/difference approach) to evolved social facts. In 
other words, the Court decided that Black people were sufficiently like white people to merit integration. Viewed in 
this way, Brown is the mirror of Lawrence: the minority “wins” because it has sufficiently—in the eyes of a Court 
constituted primarily by the majority—come to resemble the majority (or has the potential to). There is an equality 
there, for sure, but one without substance.  
 197. It is interesting that the justices dissenting in Hardwick apparently thought Loving to be the most analo-
gous precedent, too. Justices Stevens and Blackmun, both joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote dissents 
that relied on Loving. Justice Blackmun noted that ‘[t]he parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny.”  
478 U.S. at 210, n.5 (Blackmun J., dissenting). Likewise, in a footnote, Justice Stevens notes the parallels between 
the crimes of miscegenation and sodomy. Id. at 216, n.9 (Stevens J., dissenting).  
The Loving analogy has been made by academics. For a lucid analysis, see Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation 
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L. J. 145 (1989). Professor Koppelman and I cover some of 
the same ground, albeit from distinctly different starting points—he from the already well-framed law of sex dis-
crimination and I from the far less well-framed law and theory of gay liberation.  
It is no surprise that Loving should figure so prominently in the thinking and rethinking of gay equality claims. The 
relationship between Loving and Lawrence provides an historical analogy, but it, in multiple ways, provides a con-
verged reality as well. Gay people have never been owned as chattel property (at least not as gay people—surely 
there were slaves who happened to be both Black and gay); otherwise, their treatment has been similarly tragic. Like 
Blacks, gay people have been subject to systemic abuses, sexual and other physical violence, condoned and, indeed, 
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at issue in Loving because it was “designed to maintain White Supremacy.”198 The 
Court’s focus on the statute’s use to further “White Supremacy” is also a departure 
from the “trait-based’ jurisprudence that has come to define equality doctrine.199  The 
Court spends no time expostulating on the evils of classifications drawn on the par-
adigmatic trait—race. Rather the Court focused on the power relationships at play in 
a system of supremacy—power hierarchy which “violates the central meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause.”200  The one exception being Justice Stewart, who argued 
that “it is simply not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which 
makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor.”201 Race was de-
terminative for him. No other justice joined his opinion, and Chief Justice Warren’s 
majority opinion is indubitably concerned with the consequences of power and 
caste.202   
An analogy between Loving and Obergefell is also important because it illu-
mines the faultiness, constitutionally speaking at least, of transmuting the old talis-
man “love the sinner, hate the sin,” into jurisprudential theory. The “possibility that 
one can ‘hate’ an individual’s behavior without hating the individual”203 has been a 
stumbling block even to those who are largely sensitive to claims for equal citizen-
ship made by gays and lesbians. Michael Perry, for instance, wonders whether an 
“irrational fear and loathing” of homosexuals really motivates many of the laws that 
deny gays equal citizenship, for example opposition to opening civil marriage to gay 
couples.204  Perry wonders whether such resistance is rather a genuine expression of 
religiously-based moral disapproval (presumptively more benign?) for homosexual 
activity, and thus a reluctance to “incentivize” it.205  Andrew Koppelman, a con-
sistent proponent of marriage equality, has also argued that, “[n]ot all antigay 
views…deny the personhood and equal citizenship of gay people….There is a seri-
ous discussion to be had here about sexuality and morality.”206         
Now, opposition to gay “conduct” or the conduct of same-sex marriage may be, 
as Professors Perry and Koppelman see it, a genuine expression of religious morality.  
Or it may be, as I see it, a convenient rationalization for bigotry. Or it may be both. 
What Loving’s equality analysis makes quite plain, however, is that the answer to 
this conundrum makes absolutely no difference in the way the Court should adjudi-
cate an equality-based claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Religious justifica-
tions supporting anti-equality legal regimes have served as no magic shield from 
 _________________________  
often encouraged by the American legal order from the top down. Blacks, gays, and women have all been system-
atically sexualized by their governments. But these realities of the lives lived by the powerless or less powerful are 
seldom the stuff of which decisions are made in formal equality adjudication.  
 198. Loving v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
 199. See Gilreath, Of Fruit Flies and Men, supra note 3, at 16. 
 200. Loving, 358 U.S. at 12. 
 201. Id. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 202. Id. at 12 (majority opinion). 
 203. Nagel, supra note 88, at 37. For my original critique of Nagel’s position, see GILREATH, SEXUAL 
POLITICS, supra note 117, at 49.  
 204. GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY, supra note 77, at 97. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should 
Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOKLYN L. REV. 125, 145 (2006).  
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constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, the Virginia trial judge who sentenced Richard and 
Mildred Loving to banishment for the “conduct” of engaging in interracial marriage 
buttressed his decision by concluding that interracial marriage violated the laws of 
“the Creator.”  
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay 
[sic] and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but 
for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause 
for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that 
he did not intend for the races to mix.207 
Was this religious pronouncement a reflection of the deeply-held moral convic-
tion of the Virginia electorate, or was it a rationalization, religion as a tool (a very 
effective one) for the maintenance of White Supremacy?  The Court made no effort 
to solve the dilemma because it was constitutionally irrelevant. Regardless of 
whether the impetus for the miscegenation statute was one of moral force, the senti-
ments in legal operation denied equality for blacks.  
Indisputably, a religious teaching about the natural separation of the races was 
part and parcel of the Southern establishment that kept Blacks powerless.208  Anti-
gay laws rest on powerful religious convictions, too. Some such expressions mirror 
those of pro-segregation preachers in that they affirm that gays should be treated 
with “respect, compassion, and sensitivity.”209 Only their conduct (having sex with 
same-gender partners or marrying someone of the same gender) is morally dubious 
and regulable.210 No such posturing mattered to the Loving Court. All that mattered 
 _________________________  
 207. Loving, 358 U.S. at 11. 
 208. See, Shannon Gilreath and Arley Ward, Religious Accommodation and the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L. REV. 
237 (2017). 
 209. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Admin. Comm., Promote, Protect, Preserve Marriage: Statement 
on Marriage and Homosexual Unions, 33 Origins 257, 259 (2003). This concededly pretty language rings rather 
hollow to many Gay people, especially considering that the Vatican has also labeled us “inherently disordered” and 
equates our mere contact with children with child abuse.  
 210. Similar arguments, resting on moral grounds, were used to deny women equal citizenship. Consider Jus-
tice Bradley’s explanation of his decision in Bradwell v. State in which the Court upheld laws prohibiting the “con-
duct” of a woman’s practice of law: “The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and 
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.” 83 U.S. 130, 143 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).  
Or this attack on women abolitionists: 
We invite your attention to the dangers which at present seem to threaten the female character with widespread and 
permanent injury. The appropriate duties and influence of women are clearly stated in the New Testament. Those 
duties, and that influence are unobtrusive and private, but the sources of mighty power. When the mild, dependent, 
softening influence upon the sternness of man’s opinions is fully exercised, society feels the effect of it in a thousand 
forms. The power of woman is her dependence, flowing from the consciousness of that weakness which God has 
given her for protection.  
ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 
1975) (1959) (quoting a pastoral letter).  
Or: “The Creator has endowed the bodies of women with the noble mission of motherhood…Any woman who 
violates this great trust by participating in homosexuality not only degrades herself socially but also destroys the 
purpose for which God created her.” GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY, supra note 77, at n.99 (em-
phasis added).   
Condemnation of the “conduct” at issue in these statements was done to protect and further “respect, compassion 
and sensitivity” toward women, not to deny a woman’s personhood. Indeed, the hate the sin, love the sinner camp 
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was that Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law, whatever its religious justification, 
served to entrench the power of the white hierarchy—a consequence that struck at 
“the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”211  The Court saw hierarchy 
in its material, not merely formal aspects.  
What the Court saw in Loving, however momentarily, was that effectively ad-
dressing legal inequality meant recognizing the realities of social inequality. This 
approach has sadly been a limited one in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence.212  In 
other regimes, equality has fared better.  Consider three Canadian milestones: cases 
holding that anti-equality propaganda and pornography threaten equality rights safe-
guarded by the Canadian constitution. One case involved a man who taught Holo-
caust denial to high school students213; one case involved heterosexual pornogra-
phy214; and the other involved homosexual pornography.215  In each of these cases, 
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized Jews, women, and gays as historically dis-
advantaged groups and recognized that, given the material backdrop of inequality 
that contextualized the speech in question, their equality rights were more important 
than any speech interests restricted by criminalizing expressions that actively pro-
moted their inequality.  The Supreme Court of the United States, still in the grips of 
the formal equality approach to the Fourteenth Amendment, remains unable to see 
the inequality dimensions of hate propaganda and pornography at all.216 
The goal of substantive equality theory is to institutionalize and operationalize 
social equality through legal equality. It begins by articulating the systemic and sys-
tematic operationalization of inequality throughout society and moves to empower, 
in material ways, those at the bottom of social hierarchy. In this sense, it is specific 
and particular, not abstract. Its goal is to close the gap between the promise of legal 
equality and social reality. 217 
 _________________________  
would argue that the condemnation is there solely so that personhood may be fully recognized. Likewise for homo-
sexuals. The abiding insult of such pronouncements is that the pontificators purport to know what is good for gays 
better than gays know it for ourselves. Enforcing this descriptive “good” by the power of the state is exactly what 
makes such laws violate the substantive equality guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. For further discussion, 
see Shannon Gilreath, The Technicolor Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism, Ethical Norms, and Legal Peda-
gogy, 9 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 23, 33-36 (2003).  
 211. Loving, 358 U.S. at 12. 
 212. But see, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 213. Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). 
 214. Regina v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.). 
 215. Little Sisters Books & Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (Can.). 
 216. See, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992); Am. Booksellers Ass’n Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 
F.2d 323, 333-34 (7th Cir. 1985). 
  217.    See MacKinnon, Substantive Equality, supra note 2. 
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